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On 'Essentially’ ( ’öitep ') in Aristotle
In this paper I shall examine the notion of ταώτόν ■— commonly
translated as 'same' or 'identical'— and its relevance to so-called
essential predications, as effected through the use of 'δπερ ’ in
Aristotle. It will be shown that propositions of the type Ά is 0Π£ρ
B' Involve an essential predication where either a genus is affirmed
of a species, or a species of an individual. The possibility of
such predications will be founded upon the doctrine of the
categories and the ontological distinction between essence and
accident. Besides predications involving generic or specific
Identity, others effected through propositions of the type Ά
is δπερ B* will be seen to be employed by Aristotle. These latter
predications will be stricto sensu neither essential nor accidental,
yet will involve a necessary connection between subject and
predicate. I shall then examine why Aristotle believes there to be
a necessary application of predicate to subject in these cases, as
well as why certain problems of identity and synonymy follow
therefrom.
Let us begin then by observing the various senses that Aristotle
ascribes to 'ταύτόυ ·. In Topics 17 he asserts:
First of all we must distinguish the various meanings of 'the
same'. In general, 'sameness' would seem to fall into three
divisions; for we usually speak of numerical, specific and
generic sameness. There is numerical sameness when there is
more than one name for the same thing, e.g. 'mantle' and
'cloak'. There is specific sameness when there are several
things but they do not differ in species, e.g. one man and
another man, one horse and another horse; for such things as
fall under the same species are said to be specifically the
same. Similarly things are generically the same when they
fall under the same genus, e.g. horse and man (1).
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Top. 103a6-14 (trans. by Forster).

Further on he adds:
The term ’the same' seems to be applied with the most general
acceptance of everyone to that which is numerically one. But
even this is usually employed in several senses. Its
principal and primary sense occurs when sameness is applied
to a name or a definition, e.g. when a ’cloak’ is said to be
the same as a ’mantle', or, when ’a biped pedes trian animal '
is said to be the same as a 'man'. A second sense occurs
when sameness is applied to a property, e.g. when ’capable of
receiving knowledge' is said to be the same as ’man’, and
’that which is naturally carried upwards' is said to be the
same as 'fire'. A third sense occurs when the sameness is
based on an accident, e.g., when 'that which is seated* or
'that which is musical' is said to be the same as
'Socrates'. All thèse uses aim at Indicating numerical
oneness (2).
I do not intend here to comment upon each of the possible ways in
which 'ταύτόν ' is said here to have meaning. For the moment, I
should like only to draw attention to the first type of numerical
sameness, viz. that which is said to exist between 'mantle' and
'cloak'. Both are said to possess numerical sameness in spite of
their difference as individual terms, for they share the same
definition. As we shall see later on, this second type of numerical
sameness presupposes a certain form of synonymy the importance of
which must be recognized when analyzing the necessary but
non-essential predications of the form Ά is δπερΒ'.
To gain a clearer idea as to how 'δπερ ' may be employed in
statements affirming sameness or identity, let us consider the
senses that Liddell, Scott and Jones (hereafter referred to as LSJ)
ascribe to this term from the standpoint of Artistotle's logic:
In the logic of Aristotle, δαερ έστί , or αηερ alone, has two
senses: a. non-technical, and unemphatic, what (a thing)
is, έκάστη ουσία τσΟθ* δ. έστίν, ού λέγεται μδλλσν καί Tftrov
each substance is called what it i_s without the difference of
more or less, Cat. 3b36; το διπλάσιου τσυθ* δ. έστίν,
έτέρου λέγεται
the double is called
what it
(viz. the double) of something, i.e. is relative,
ib.6a39. b. expressing identity, Ούτε ή χιών δ. λευκόν snow is
not what white is, i.e., is not identical with white. Top.
120b23; δ λευκδςΐϊνθρωπος σύκ έστιν δ. χρώμα
ib.H6a27:
hence, to indicate the precise or essential nature of a
thing, ού γάρ &v <ραίη δ. κακόν τι είναι"Tflv ήδσνήν
he would
not say that pleasure is essentially something bad, EN
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Top. 103 a 23-31 (trans. by Forster)
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1153b6; τα μεν σύσίαν σημαίνοντα δ. έκεινο fi δ. έκεινό τι.
σημαίνει expressions which show the essence show precisely
what the thing in question ij3 or precisely of what kind it ijs
Ti.e. indicate either its species or its genus) , APo. 83 a
24; δ. <£0δε^>τί έστι το τί f¡v είναι
the essence of a thing
1s precisely a 'this*, i.e. fully specified particular,
Metaph. 1030 a 3; f| μεν
[ έπιστήμη ] δ. άνδρώπσυ έστίν knowledge
(that man is an animal) is apprehension that 'animal' is an
element in the essential nature of man, APo. 89 a 35 (3).
I should like now to examine the examples cited by LSJ in their
definition of the term ' δπερ' in its unemphatic form (sense a.). In
both examples 'δπερ ' appears in its conventional relative pronominal
form. The predicate 'not being susceptible of more or less' is
affirmed of the subject 'essence', similarly, the predicate 'being
said of something else' is affirmed of the subject 'double'. Each
of these examples reveals that a specific subject, insofar as it is
what it is, possesses a specific predicate. Further, it is safe to
assume that in each of these predications the application of the
predicate to the subject occurs necessarily. What must be
determined, however, is whether ' oô λέγεται μάλλον χαΐ* ήττσν
'
applies essentially to 'οδσία ’ and whether ' έτέρου λέγεται * applies
essentially to 'τιρδς τι ' and hence to 'διπλάσιαν ’. Now it must be
observed that essential predicates ( χατηγομρούμενα χαθ'αύτά
), i.e.
those that are affirmed έν χφ τί έστι
of their subjects (4) are
basically of two sorts: generic and specific (5). Further, it is
according to the order of genus and species that the predicates of
the category of essence as well as those of the accidental
categories are classified. It is by virture of such a
classification and of the irreducible particularity of each category
that one can rightly claim, e .g., that man is essentially an animal
but only accidentally white. The essence-accident distinction
therefore implies not only the categorical differences between
substances, qualities, quantities, etc., but also the hierarchical
order présent in each category according to which the predicates of
greater intension are subsumed under those of greater extension. In
the light of these brief remarks, I think it can be easily seen that
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A Greek-English Lexicon, ed. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S.
Jones, Oxford, l$6l, pT 1262.
Cf. An. post. 73 a 34-35.
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Cf. An. post. 92 a 6-7; Top. 101 b 18-19, 108 b 22-23, 139 a
29-31, 143 b 8-9, 153 a 18, 154 a 27; Met. 1022 a 25-29, 1029 b
13-14, 1030 a 11-13, 1037 a 29.
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’not being susceptible of more or less' does not apply essentially
to 'essence'. For if the contrary were true, then 'essence' would
be merely a definite species of a higher genus, an extensionally
greater categorical determination under which 'essence' would be
subsumed. As for 'double', it is already a specification of the
class of things called relatives, which Aristotle sets apart in the
following manner:
We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what
they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in
relation to something else (6).
Now what is affirmed here of 'relative' certainly applies to
'double' essentially, insofar as 'relative' is the genus of
'double'. It does not follow from this, however, that 'being said
of something else' applies to 'relative' essentially, i.e. in the
same way as 'relative' applies to 'double'. For otherwise 'double'
would be a species of 'relative' (which it is) and 'relative* would
be a species of a higher genus (which it is not).
The problem that must now be addressed is that of the manner in
which the predicates 'not being susceptible of more or less' and
'being said of something else' apply to'essence' and 'relative'
respectively, since they cannot do so essentially. The most
appropriate solution to this problem would seem to be that they
apply to their subjects as properties (Côia )· For properties, as
Aristotle states in the Topics, are not predicated essentially of
their subjects, yet are co-extensive with them and belong to them
always and of necessity (7). The classic example of a property as
defined by Aristotle is that of man's capacity to acquire the art of
reading and writing (8). This property is certainly related to
man's specific difference, viz. rationality, but unlike this latter,
is not partaken of by the subject — the subject being considered
here from the point of view of his specific essence — , i.e. is not
a constitutive element of the definition of the subject (9).
Further, Aristotle does in fact ascribe C6ta to the ulimate
categorical determinations of 'ούσ£α ' and 'ττιοόόν '· The property of
any ούσ£α is that, while numerically one and the same, it is able to
take on contraries (10); the property of any ττοσόν is that it is
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Cat . 6 a 36-37 (trans. by Ackrill).
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C f . Top. 102 a 19-22, 129a 24-26, 131 a 27-31, 131 b 30-32.
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Cf. Top. 102 a 20-22.

9/

Cf. Top. 132 b 35-133 a 3.

10 / Cf. Cat

4 a 10-11
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able to be called either equal or unequal (11). But in ascribing
properties to ultimate genera of being Aristotle does not fully free
himself of the implication that in some manner a superior genus and
specific differences are required to delimit the meanings of these
genera.
For it is the case that a property can be designated as
such only in contradistinction to essence, just as a species is
necessarily contrasted with its genus and an accident with the
substance in which it is found. But what would be the essence of
the ultimate genus 'essence* against which a given attribute 'x'
could be compared and set apart as a property? How could one even
hope to grant linguistic expression to such an essence, assuming it
could be determined, given the final form of the Aristotelean
doctrine of categories? It should be observed in this connection
that, according to Aristotle, it is only the essential (καθ* αύτά )
and permanent (άει) properties that apply necessarily and at all
times to their subjects (12). So a distinction not only between
essence and property, but also between essential and non-essential
properties is implied in the ascription of a property to a subject
with which it is said to be co-extensive. Furthermore, in the first
book of the Topics, when Aristotle presents his famous list of the
predicables, he points out that the ίδιαν can be of two sorts: the
first, which expresses the t£ fív είναι
of a subject, is more
appropriately called the definition (δρος ); the second, which
expresses a predicate merely co-extensive with the subject, is more
rightly called a property (13). Finally, in Topics V Aristotle
affirms that a property is correctly assigned to a subject only if
it can be shown to apply to it naturally■(φύσει ) (14).
The point of the foregoing remarks is the following. To say that a
predicate applies either essentially or as a property to an ulimate
genus of being presuppoes that there is an essence of that genus.
But it is exactly this presupposition that cannot be made since
ultimate genera of being have no essences yet, qua genera, are the
fundamental bases of the specific essences of which they are
affirmed. At best one might maintain that ultimate genera are their
own essences, which is the equivalent of the contention that they
are no essences at all, since they are not the product of the
information of genera by specific differences which would give rise
to their specific essential being (15). It follows then that the

w

Cf

Cat. 6 a 26-27.
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Cf

Top. 129 a 17-26.
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Cf

Top. 101 b 19-22.
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Cf

Top. 134 b 5-7.

15/

Cf

Top. 143 b 8-9.
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predicates ’not being susceptible of more or less' and 'being said
of something else' cannot apply, properly speaking, χατ* tÔLCtv
or êv χψ τC έσχι, to 'ούσΰα ' and 'npÓQ Tt ' respectively. Hence in
the two examples of the unemphatic sense of the term 'δπερ ' cited by
LSJ, this term is not employed to indicate a strict or well-defined
application of a predicate to a subject according to the modes of
essence or property.
I should now like to turn to sense b of ' δπερ' which, according to
LSJ, expresses identity. My purpose here will be to determine
whether in this sense the term 'δπερ ' may be employed
1) to effect only a single form of essential predication;
2) to effect predictions that cannot rightly be called
essential.
Concerning point 1 it is important to remember that according to
Aristotle essential predications involve the application of either a
generic predicate to a term representative of a species, or of a
species-term to an individual subject. Further, it is of interest
to notice that Aristotle does not distinguish between the functions
of the copula in these two types of predication. It thus becomes
possible to follow certain syllogistic forms of reasoning, as does
Aristotle in the following text of the Categories :
For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and
animal of man; so animal will be predicated of the individual
man also— for the individual man is both a man and an animal
(16).
Now it is a well-known fact that in the history of logic Peano first
distinguished between the relation of an individual to its class and
the inclusion of one class in another (17). This distinction is
concisely illustrated by Russell:
For example, the relation of the Greek nation to the human
race is different from that of Socrates to the human race,
and the relation of the whole of the primes to the whole of
the numbers is different from that of 2 to the whole of the
numbers (18).

i— /

Cat. 1 b 12-15 (trans. by Ackrill).

•iZ^

Cf. J. Vuillemin, De la logigue a la théologie:
sur Aristote, Paris, 1967, p. 55.

A— ^

B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd edition,
London, 1938, p. 134.

cinq etudes
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The immediate consequence of this distinction was that any syllogism
of the type:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
was demoted to the status of a pseudo-syllogism (19). It is
certain, however, that Aristotle sees no problem in maintaining a
unity of meaning for the verb ’to be’ in statements of the type
'Socrates is a man’ and those of the type ’Men are mortal' Insofar
as both statements involve the application of an essential predicate
to a subject. The question here is whether he employs ' δπερ' in the
sense of identity defined by LSJ, i.e., with the meaning of
'essentially*. In the formulation of such statements.
Clear examples of what Peano understood by inclusion, and what is to
be seen as its contrary, i.e. exclusion, are found in the two texts
of the Topics cited by LSJ. Snow is not essentially white, i.e. is
not a species of the genus ’white'; white man is not essentially
color, i.e. is not a species of the genus 'color'. These two
examples are by no means the only ones provided by the Topics in
which 'fcnrp* is used in instances of inclusion or exclusion. On the
contrary, as Brunschwig points out, Aristotle frequently employs the
expression Ά is δπερ B' in the Topics to affirm that B belongs to
the essence of A and hence that it is the genus of A; Brunschwig
cites seven occurrences of this expression in the Topics other than
those indicated by LSJ (20). As regards the relation of an
individual subject to its class, one is better served with examples
taken from the Posterior Analytics. In I, 22 Aristotle affirms that
when the wood undergoes a change so as to become white, it is
incorrect to say that the white thing ( τό λευκών ) qua white or qua a
species of white ( δπερ λευκόν τι ) has become wood, for whiteness is
merely an accident of wood (21). This example points out that even
if the white thing belongs to a species of white, it will be wrong
to say that, as such, it has become wood.

19/

Cf. J. Vuillemin, op. clt., p. 55.

20/

Cf . J. Brunschwig, Aristote :
Par is , 1967, p. 154.

21/

Cf. An . post. 83 a 4-9.

Les topiques (livres I-IV),
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A few lines further in the same chapter Aristotle reiterates this
point by affirming that when the wood receives the accidental
determination of whiteness, it does so, not qua anything else, but
qua wood or a species of wood ( ft δττερ ζύλον ft'ξύλον τι ) (22).
It is thus clear that ’ örtep ’ in the sense of ’essentially* is used
by Aristotle to effect predications from the individual standpoints
of genus and species, i.e. is used to designate instances of two of
the three principal typés of sameness or identity indicated in the
text of the Topics cited at the beginning of this paper. But it is
also used to designate, if only partially, an instance of the third
form of *tafrrôv ’» i*e. that according to number. For things may be
numerically the same by virture of definition, and definition, in
expressing the essence of a thing, reveals the determination of a
definite species in a particular genus (23).
I should now like to turn to my second point raised with regard to
the sense of ’δπερ * indicating identity, i.e. the question as to
whether ’οπερ * may be used in this sense without the meaning of
’essentially’. Let us examine in this connection the text of the
Metaphysics cited by LSJ, i.e. 1030 a 3. In this text
the t C ftv είναι
Is said to be örtep [τόόε ] τι (24). In the light of
LSJ’s translation of this text, it is clear that ’thisness’ or
determinateness or definiteness is affirmed of the x¿ ftv είναι . It
is in relatively similar fashion that this text is rendered in
Bonitz’s German translation:
Denn das Sosein is ein einzelnes Etwas (25).
The same is true of Tricot’s French translation.
En effet, la quidditë d ’un être est son essence individuelle
et déterminée (26).

22/

cf. An. post. 83 a 12-14.

23/

Cf. An. post. 90b 30-31; Top. 130b 2-6, 139 a 29-35, 143 b
6-10, 19-22; Met. 1031 a 12.
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Ross, contrary to Bonitz, reads δπερ γ<5ρ τ£
in Met. 1030 a 3,
but argues for the synonymy of τι and τόόε τι » cf Aristotle *a
Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924, Vol. II, p. 170.

25/

Aristotles’ Metaphysik, griech.-dt./ in der Übers, von Η.
Bonitz; hrsg. von H. Seidel, 2 Halbbd., Hamburg, 1980.

26/

Aristote:
1970.

La métaphysique, 2 vol., trad. J. Tricot, Paris,
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Ross, who reads the text somewhat differently, translates:
For the essence is precisely what something ^s (27).
It is interesting to note that in the cited translations of Met.
1030 a 3 'δπερ ' is either not translated (Bonitz), translated
substantively in connection with fτόδε] τι (Tricot) or translated
as ’precisely'· There is hence a hesitation on the part of the
translators to render ’δπερ’ as 'essentially' - a hesitation I
believe to be well justified. For how could 'τι ', τάδε τι « Dr any
predicate 'x' be affirmed essentially of 'essence', if there can be
nothing more fundamental than essence (28)? Indeed, as I pointed
out in my remarks on the unemphatic sense of ' δπερ ’, essence is not
itself a determinate species of being of which attributes could be
affirmed essentially. Further, it is interesting to observe that in
the same chapter of Met. Z in which 1030 a 3 appears, Aristotle
explicity denies that there may be an essence of anything that
cannot be determined as a species of a genus. The name (δνσμα ) of
anything incapable of such a determination will at best have a
formula ( λόγος) indicating its meaning, but as such will have no
specific definition (ορισμός ), nor will it serve to designate
anything having an essence (29). It thus follows that in accordance
with the strict sense of 'essence’ as regards attributions of
identity, the τί ?ίν είναι
is not essentially a 'this' and that in
Me¿. 1030 a 3 'δπερ' is not employed to designate an instance of
generic or specific identity. Further, even if one were to retain
the translations of LSJ or Ross, there would still remain the
problem of determining the basis upon which essence would be
precisely a 'this' or precisely what something is.
I thus should like to go beyond the definition of 'δπερ' (sense b)
provided by LSJ and call this particular sense of 'δπερ' indicating
non-essential identity that of 'indeterminate identity'.

27/

Aristotle: Metaphysics. Oxford trans. of W.D. Ross in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, New York, 1941” The
stress on 'is' is that of Ross. The text of Ross as revised
by J. Barnes reads: "For the essence is what something is,"
cf. The Collected Works of Aristotle, Princeton, 1984.

28/

cf. Met. 1029 a 13-14.

29/

cf. Met. 1030 a 11-17.
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It le ln my view Indeterminate since In statements such as that of
Met. 1030 a 3 neither a generic nor specific identity is expressed,
nor a fortiori one of definition. Nor does it seem at all possible
that merely an accidental identity is implied. And as to whether
*ftrorp ' is employed in Met. 1030 a 3 to attribute a property to
essence, I should draw attention here to my remarks made previously
in reference to the unemphatic sense of 'δπερ · to urge that it
cannot. It is thus apparent that when employed in this specific
sense, ’ δπερ' expresses a type of identity that is not at all
attested in the passage of the Topics cited at the beginning of this
paper.
It is important to recognize that' Met ♦ 1030 a 3 is not an isolated
case of statements expressing indeterminate identity. There are
certainly other instances of ’δπερ · having this sense to be found in
the Aristotelean Corpus. I shall point out here only three others,
each found in the Metaphysics, as well as the various translations
of the passages in which they appear:
1) .

Met.
l(TÜ3b32-33 :
δ* ή έκδοτου oúcrCa έν έστι,ν ού κατα
συμβεβηχός, δμοέως δε και δπερ δν t l .
Ross: And if, further, the substance of each thing is
one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from
its very nature something that is.
Bonitz: Auch ist jedes Wesen eines, nicht bloss in
akzidentellem Sinne, und ebenso 1st es seiend an sich.
Tricot: De plus, la substance de chaque être est une,
et cela non par accident, et de même elle est aussi,
essentiellement, quelque chose qui existe.

2).

Met_. 1045a36-1045b2 :δαχ δέ'μή έχει ύλην/ μήτε νοητην
μήτε αόσθητήν, εύθυς δπερ έν τι (εΓναιΓ] έστι,ν έκαστον,
ώσπερ καί δπερ δν τι, το τδδε, τ<5"holóv , τδ ποαόν.
Ross: But of the things which have no matter, either
intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature
essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a
kind of being— individual substance, quality, or
quantity.
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Bonitz: Was aber keinen Stoff hat, weder denkbaren,
noch sinnlich wahrnehmbaren, das 1st unmittelbar das,
was Eines 1st, so wie auch das, was Seindes 1st,
nämlich das bestimmte Etwas, das Qualitative, das
Quantitative.
Tricot: Quant aux choses qui n'ont pas de matière,
soit Intelligible, soit sensible, c'est immédiatement
et essentiellement un être, soit substance, soit
qualité, soit quantité.

3) .

Met. 1051b-30-32: δαα δή éottv δπερ είναι τι wat
ΐνεργεύςι, περί ταϋτα ουκ έστιν άπατηθ^ναι άλλ* ff
voetv ff μή.
Ross: About the things, then, which are essences and
actualities, it is not possible to be in error, but
only to know them or not to know them.
Bonltz: Bei dem also, was ein Sein an sich und ln
Wirklichkeit ist, ist keine Täuschung möglich, sondern \
nur Denken (vernunftmässiges Erfassen) oder Nichtdenken.

Tricot: Pour tout ce qui est précisément une essence
et qui existe en acte, il ne peut donc y avoir erreur;
il y a seulement, ou il n y a pas, connaissance de ces
... ■■êtres.
In the first text the subject clearly is ούσία , while that of the
second is the first three ultimate genera of being, and that of the
last actual essences. In the lines immediately following those of
the second above-cited text of the Metaphysics Aristotle explicitly
states that neither 'το δν' nor *το δν ' represents the genus or
figures in the definition of 'το τόδε *, 'τδ tiolóv ' or ’ το ποσόν ’
(30). Moreover, it is interesting to notice the variety of
translation in each of the three texts. At times 'δπερ* is not
translated at all; at other times it is translated as 'precisely',
'immediately' or even.'essentially *. This reveals, I believe, the
difficulty of the reader of Aristotle to determine exactly the
manner in which a subject S that, properly speaking, cannot be said
to possess an essence, is x qua δπερ x. And if one is to urge that S
is immediately or precisely x, how then is one to convincingly
defend Aristotle against the charge that the immediacy or precision
of x!s application to S is in fact based on nothing more than flat,
convention or arbitrary judgment? Could it not be further argued.

12

in recollection of Rant 's criticism of Aristotle » that in the case
of the attribution of immediate predicates to ulimate genera of
being, not only this attribution, but also the establishment of the
table of the ultimate genera of being in its final form is the
expression not of a system, but rather a mere rhapsody (31).
I do not wish to imply here that Aristotle does not attempt to offer
any justification of.the attribution of a predicate to a subject by
means of ' δπερ' in the sense of indeterminate identity. On the
contrary, in defence of his claim at 1030 a 3 he affirms that
the τί fiv είναι is not a predicate which is asserted of a subject
other than itself. At 1003b 32-33 ούσία is said to be δπερ δν τι
in
the same manner as it is one, i.e. non-accidentally. According to
the assertion made at 1045 a 36-1045 b 2 ultimate genera of being
are δπερ δν τι and δπερ δν τι
since they have neither intelligible
nor sensible matter. And in conformity with Aristotle's statement
at 1051b 30-32, things which are δπερ είναι τι καί ένέργειαι
are
those about which one cannot be mistaken. The point that I wish to
underline, however, is that Aristotle offers us no way to determine
why the reasons adduced for the applications of the above-cited
predicates to their respective subjects are in fact sufficient for
the necessity of these applications.
There are other problems which follow from Aristotle’s use of 'δπερ '
in the sense of indeterminate identity that are worthy of our
attention.
For example, let us consider again the text of Met. 1030
a 3. In this text it is affirmed that the xt fiy είναι
is
immediately or precisely a 'this' . And here 'thisness ' should be
viewed not as the physical determinateness proper to a composite
substance, but rather as the determinateness proper to that which is
presupposed by the definition of all non-essential terms, yet does
hot figure in their definition as either a generic or specific
element (32). In other words, the xi fiv είναι
is said to be a

10/

cf. Met. 1045 b 2-5.

■âj/

Cf. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, (traps.
L.W. Beck), Indianapolis, 195Ö, p. 7Ö.

Ü /

Cf. Met. 1029 b 22-1030 a 3, 1030 a 27-1030 b6.
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•this* Insofar as it possesses a focal meaning upon which the
meanings of the other categories are based (33). The fact that
Aristotle is here referring to conceptual rather than physical
thisness is illustrated by what he says in 1030 a 4-5. The white
man is not 0περ τόδε τι
. This is consonant with Aristotle’s view
that ’white man* is not an essence, since man is not essentially
white (34). However, if Aristotle were speaking here from the
perspective of the Categories, he certainly would be constrained to
say that the white man is immediately a τόδε τι , for the expression
’white man' refers to a primary substance and a primary substance by
its very nature is τόδε τι (35). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s use of
*τόδε ' and ’τόδε TL ' in lines 1030 a 3-6 seems to me consistent and
to indicate the meaning of conceptual and not physical
determinateness (36). Hence, when in 1030 a 5-6 he affirms
that το τόδε belongs only to ταις oûoCats , I read him as attributing
conceptual determinateness to essences and not physical
determinateness to substances. Moreover, there is no apparent
reason to believe that the attribution of ’[τόδε Jri 1
to τί f|V είναι
is any more immediate or complete than that
of το τόδε to ταΐς ουσ(αις , If this reading is correct, then the
question of the synonymy of ’ τί ?Jv είναι · and ’οόσ£α · arises.
For
if both are immediately a ’this' and it is only ούσ£αι that possess
thisness, then there would seem to be a ground upon which to base
the claim that 'τ£ ?¡v είναι * and * ουσία * are indeed, synonymous,
even though at times translators render the former as ’quiddity' and
the latter as 'essence'.
It is important to observe here that Aristotle's statements on the
question of synonymy are not altogether consistent. For example, in
the Categories he declares that things are synonymous when they
share the same name and definition:

Strictly speaking it is oCxsia which is said to have a focal
meaning with respect to the other categories. Nevertheless,
το τί 7¡v είναι
is said to belong especially to οόσία (cf. Met.
1031 a 12-14; 1030 a 29-30). On the question of focal meaning
in Aristotle's categories, cf. G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and
Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in Aristotle
and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Goteborg, 1960, p. 169.
Ü/

Cf. Met. 1030 a 1-2.
C f . Cat. 3 b 10.

-âÜ/

'

■
;

On the possibility of expressing either a conceptual or
physical determinateness by means of 'τόδε τι', cf. J.A. Smith,
" Τόδε τι i“ Aristotle," The Classical Review, 1921, p. 19.
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Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals.
Each of these Is called, by a common name, an animal,
and the definition of being is also the same; for if
one is to give the definition of each — what being an
animal is for each of them — one will give the same
definition (37).
However, in the Rhetoric, he affirms that two different terms can be
called synonymous if they share the same meaning;
Synonyms are useful to the poet, by which I mean words
whose ordinary meaning is the same, e .g .τιοεύεσται
(advancing) andßaö££tiv
(proceeding); these two are
ordinary words and have the same meaning (38).
If we follow Aristotle’s view of synonymy expressed in the Rhetoric
passage, then two synonymous terms, by virture of their identical
meaning, will* share the same definition and hence possess a
numerical identity, as was seen to be true of 'cloak' and 'mantle*
in the text of the Topics dealing with identity cited at the
beginning of this paper. Further, this view of synonymy allows for
the verification of such a numerical identity through the
determination of the identity of the genera and specific differences
employed in the definition of each term. Now we have observed that
Aristotle employs the expression Ά is δπερ B' in certain instances
to Indicate that B is the genus of A. So if in such an instance
another term C were also δπερ B, it would follow that A and C would
possess generic identity. And if it could be shown that their
specific differences were the same, then they could be said to be
synonymous.
An obvious problem, however, arises when in an expression based on
'Ais δπερ B ', i .e . 'το> δπερ B’, B is replaced by 'τόόε τι '. For
insofar as * τόόε τι ' does not refer to a genus of which there could
be particular species, it would be difficult to determine to what
specifically it refers in a given instance, even if it must refer to
that which is δπερ τόόε τι , i.e., τ£ fjv είναι
, οόσύα or
perhaps είδος (39). Hence with regard to a text such as that of

12.

Cat. 1 a 8-12 (trans. by Ackvill).

—

Rhet « 1404b 37-1405 a 2 (trans. by Roberts). On Aristotle's
Inconsistencies regarding the question of synonymy, cf. J.
Hintikka, "Aristotle on the Ambiguity of Ambiguity" in Time and
Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality, Oxford,
W 3 , p. 9.
“
—

11

Cf. Met. 1017 b 24-26.
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Topics 116a 23, there is no a priori reason for asserting that
'το οττερ τόδε τι
' refers specifically to a τι ?¡v είναι
rather than
an οόσία or an είδος , even if it does refer to a concept and not a
thing, in this particular instance 'justice' and not the just man.
And this is why translators of Aristotle read ’ τό δτιερ τόδε τι ' as
implying alternatively the general sense, idea or definition of that
which it designates (40). Similarly, in the light of Met♦ 1045 a
36-1045b2 it is correct to say that ' το δπερ ëv ' and ' τό δπερ δν '
may be used to designate any of the categories.
But Insofar as 'ëv '
and 'σν' are not generic terms predicable of species which could be
distinguished on the basis of specific differences, the synonymy or
equivocity of terms designated by ' το ΰπερ ëv ’ and ' τδ δτιερ δν ' will
remain indeterminable. For it to be otherwise, one would have to
appeal to the notion of essential identity and thereby presuppose
the notions of genus, species and definition.
It is thus my conclusion that when used in the sense of
indeterminate identity in statements of the form Ά is δτιερ B' and 'C
is δτιερ B
δτιερ ' is not to be translated as 'essentially' and that
the question of the synonymy of A and C in such statements is to be
viewed as undecidable. This of course does not mean that Aristotle
never implies in his writings an identity of meaning applying to
terms such as 'τ ί fiv είνα ι ', ' οόσία' and ' είδος '.
It is rather the contrary that is true. But I do find it
significant that in a book of the Metaphysics such as Z where
Aristotle distinguishes between το τί ήν είναι
and το είδος in order
to better determine what οόσία is, in the last chapter of this book
he sees no obstacle to the implicit affirmation of their identity,
as if this were not fundamentally problematic:
φανερόν τοινυν δτι ζητεΤ τδ αΓτιον* τούτο δ 'έσ τί το τ ί fív
είνα ι ( 41) ; άστε το α ίτιο ν ζητείται της

όλης ( τούτο δ'έστί τδ είδος

) φ τί έστιν* τούτο δ* ή οόσία (42).

40

Commenting upon the expression ^"δπερ τόδε τ ι
Brunschwig
Quant à τόδε τι , il ne désigne pas la substance
affirms :
concrète, comme ailleurs chez Aristote; il faut le considérer
comme une sorte de variable, qui désigne cela meme dont il
est question dans les notions considérées, le noyau de sen
qui s'exhibe en elles (J. Brunschwig, ££. cit ♦, pp 154-55) "
P. Gohleke asserts: "Der Ausdruck ' δτιερ τόδε τ ι ' stammt au
Aristotles' akademischer Zeit und bedeutet eigentlich die
eines Gegenstandes (P. Gohlke, Aristotles: Topik, Paderbo
1952, pp. 332-33).” As for C. Arpe, he argues: "Die Form
δπερ τόδε τ ι
ist mehrdeutig; durch sie wird entweder
definitorische Identifikation ausgedrückt, odpr aber
Identifikation mit einem Ding, streng im Slnnè der ersten
Kategorie.. .Also an sich, ist die Formel δτιερ ΐό δ ε τ ι
j
indifferent gegen Kategoriale Unterscheidungen; sie bezeichnet)
die definitorische Identification, und ob es sich bei der
Definition um ein Ding handelt oder nicht, spielte ursprünglich
jedenfalls keine Rolle (Das
τί fjv ε ίν α ι
bei Aristotles,
Hamburg, 1938, pp. 34-3577”
“

41

Met. 1041 a 27-28.

42

Met. 1041 b 7-9.

